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Appellants petition for rehearing in this matter, upon the following grounds:

DISPOSITION OF INTEREST ON DEPOSITED FUNDS
The legal principles relied upon by the Court in denying appellants any part of interest accumulated on deposited funds in this
matter are inapposite.

The Court's understanding of the facts perti-

nent to this question is fundamentally incorrect.

Applicable Law
The Court has relied upon cases from Florida and California
(under a specific California statute) which hold that where a purcha
er of property deposits funds for the purpose, and subsequently with
draws them because seller wrongfully cannot or will not complete the
transaction, buyer is entitled to interest accruing on his money whi
on deposit.

See Rasmussen v. Moe, 292 P.2d 226, 230 (Calif. 1956);

Resnick v. Goldman, 133 So. 2d 770, 771-772 (Fla. 1961).
are inapplicable:

These cas<

appellants do not dispute that if respondent wen

to take back his money and withdraw his complaint, he would be enti
tied to the interest accumulated on the deposit.

The cases relied

upon by the Court do not hold, or imply, that where the transaction
completed and the money delivered to the seller, interest on the
deposit should be awarded to buyer, as has been done in the present
case.

The applicable rule is, in fact, precisely the opposite:

ij

the transaction is enforced, interest on the price presumptively
belongs to seller.
The appropriate rule in the present circumstances, for which

1

apposite Utah case law exists, is that where specific performance is
decreed the parties are to be given the benefits of their bargain as
of the date it was to be executed.

The buyer should have the benefit

of possession of the land, and the seller should have the benefit of
possession of the money, from the date of execution.

The court is

required in such case to apportion between buyer and seller the value
of the money deposited, and the value of the use of the land, from and
after the date money and land should have been exchanged, based upon
who actually had use of the money and/or land.
P.2d 427 (Utah 1980).

Eliason v. Watts, 615

If, because of a deposit, buyer has not had use

of his money, and the seller has meanwhile denied buyer use of the
land, the buyer is entitled to the interest accumulated on the money
(and perhaps also to additional rental value of the land).

On the

other hand, if the seller has not had use of the money, and has
provided buyer use of the land, the seller is entitled to the interest
on the deposited funds.

If buyer and seller have shared use of the

land, some appropriate apportionment of the interest is required.
Anything else denies the parties the benefit of their bargain.

Undisputed Facts
Facts admitted in this case demonstrate that Miller was provided
full use of the property, with a single exception:

appellants have

given respondent full possession, use and enjoyment of the property
throughout this matter, and respondent has admittedly utilized them as
he sees fit, with the single exception that, with respondent's knowledge and consent, during one three month season in one year a fraction of the property was rented to a third person for grazing.

Appel-

lants, meanwhile, have not set foot on the property, or made any other
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use of it, and have been prevented by respondent's lis pendens from
making any disposition of it.

It is simply admitted in this case that

respondent has had all the use and enjoyment of the property he would
have had if appellants had accepted the money deposited, with a singl<
small exception.

Appellants are prepared to have the proceeds of tha

exception deducted from interest on their funds, or to pay such proceeds to respondent.
(During the pendency of this appeal, the small part of the land
which can be leased, by agreement of the parties has been leased, anc
the funds deposited to be delivered to the owner of the property
according to the outcome of the appeal.)
Certainly, it is true that respondent's possession, use and
control of the property before and after the deposit have not change
respondent maintained a house and employee on the property, kept the
keys to the gates, had authority to prevent others entering, and mad
all the use of the property he wished before attempting to acquire t
property as well as after.
295, 297, 782.

Tr., Vol. II, pp. 223, 275, 280, 287-29."

Indeed, respondent testified that it was to preserv<

and continue the use of the property which he and his family had mathat he attempted to purchase it.
terial.

Id.

That fact, however, is imma

All that is significant is that he was not denied possessi

use and control after the deposit, and, in fact, his possession, us
and control continued thereafter.
Respondent claims - and the District Court found - that the
actual use of the property made by respondent was "sporadic".
equally immaterial.
recreational uses:

Thii

The property is a large one having essentiall
no one would have expected respondent to fully

occupy the entire property all the time.
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What is material is that

use respondent wished to make was denied.

If he had full use and

possession, and chose to exercise the right only "sporadically", the
legal affect is quite the same as if he had full use and possession
and utilized the property constantly.

The admitted facts are that

respondent kept a house and an employee on the premises at all times,
that he kept the keys to the gates at all times, that he had authority
at all times to exclude others, that respondent and his family made
such uses as they wished when they wished, and that no one impeded any
use of the land they wished to make.
It is equally immaterial that Respondent did not use the small
part of the property which can be rented to a local cattle operation.
The undisputed evidence is that this part of the property was at all
times offered to Respondent, and that Respondent declined.

Only then

was this part of the property rented to another, and the proceeds held
to abide the outcome of the appeal.

Id.

It may also be true that third persons gained access to the land
from time to time and made uses of it similar to respondent's.
fact is also immaterial.
trespass.

This

The property is fenced and posted against

It has locked gates on the access roads.

Respondent,

before the attempt to purchase the property, was given authority, and
requested, to keep others off.

The authority and request were not

revoked when respondent attempted to purchase..

That is, if others

entered and used the land thereafter, they did so at respondent!s
leave, not at appellants1.
Of course, respondent's use of the land was without appellants'
objection.

This is equally immaterial.

Nothing in the apposite rule

says that buyer's use of the land counts only if he obtained it by
trespass.
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The District Court's finding that appellants "enjoyed possession
and all rights of ownership" of the Anderson Ranch is either an empty
finding of "rights" never exercised, or simply contrary to the only
evidence.

Except for the lease of a fraction of the property in a

fraction of one year, which appellants did with the knowledge and
acquiescence of respondent, appellants never had possession, never
having set foot on the land, and never exercised ownership.
II, pp. 287-782; Vol. IV, p. 521.

Tr., Vol

A lis pendens in effect at all

pertinent times prevented any exercise of ownership.

Relief Requested
The Court has decreed specific performance.

Specific performan

is not available unless plaintiff tenders full performance on his
side:

part of that performance is that the money paid for the land

was due to be delivered to appellants on the date of deposit.

Inter

est accumulating on the money thereafter belongs to appellants, exec
to the extent that respondent can show that he has been denied some
use of the land he would have made.

It is essential to recognize tl

the burden of proof on this point must be respondent's:

he must sh

that the benefits of the bargain he seeks to enforce are not delive
able because he was denied some use he wished to make, or that acti
use of the land by appellants prevented respondent's use.
failed.

He has

The admitted facts are that respondent behaved as the bene

ficial owner of the land for years before he attempted to buy it, 1
it was to preserve such uses that he attempted to buy the land, anc
that appellant's refusal to accept the tendered funds in no way in
rupted respondent's continuing use and enjoyment of the property,
single exception is a short term lease of a part of the property.
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This lease, however, was entered into with the knowledge and acquiescence of respondent:

it did not in any manner oust him of any use of

the property he wished to make.
It is unnecessary and inappropriate to recompense respondent for
uses of the land he admittedly was never denied by awarding him interest on money the Court decrees belonged to appellants.

It is wrong,

by refusing them interest on their money, to penalize appellants for
uses of the property they admittedly never made.
The only appropriate ruling in this case is that the interest
which has accumulated on appellants1 money belongs to appellants,
except insofar as the Court may deduct rentals received for the period
appellants leased a small part of the land.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
The Court has apparently misunderstood on whose behalf and about
whom witness Allen testified, and the nature of the conflict in evidence in this case.

As a result, the Court's enforcement of the

decree of specific performance establishes an unprecedented evidentiary standard, and voids the consideration the Court holds was the
object of the transaction, in disregard of Utah Supreme Court
authority.

Summary of the Evidence
The Court at page 5 of its Opinion correctly recites that "at
trial, there was conflicting testimony on the necessity of paying the
$5000 to Archer and Wolfe".

It then summarizes this conflict as

consisting on one side of Mr. Allen, the attorney who prepared the
documents, and on the other of Mr. Colman, whom the Court regarded as
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impeached:

"The trial court found Allenfs testimony more credible and

consistent than Colman's, finding that the $5000 was never intended tc
be paid."

Again, this correctly summarizes what the District Court

did and what the evidence was in support of the District Court's
ruling.

As a statement of evidence in support of the ruling, however

it is manifestly inadequate because i/t bears upon the understanding o
only one side of the transaction.
Perhaps the Court did not understand that Mr. Allen represented,
and regarded himself as representing, only Mr. Colman, the original
seller of the property, and specifically disavowed any attempt to
understand, or any understanding of the buyers 1 , Mr. Archerfs and Mr
Wolfe 1 s, purposes, intentions, or understandings.
94-95.

Tr., Vol. I, pp.

That is, the evidence held to support the District Corut!s

ruling is the testimony of seller and seller's attorney, limited by
seller's contrary testimony and the admission of the attorney that 1:
made no effort to understand and did not understand the buyers' thir
ing, that seller got the option without having to pay the price recited in the document.
Against this testimony, and simply ignored by the District Cou
was the uncontradicted testimony of Archer and Wolfe, fully consist
with the documents and the surrounding curcumstances, that they alw
believed the $5000 had to be paid, that they believed the payment v
essential to realization of their tax purposes, and consistently
demanded its payment from and after the date the Option became ope
tive.

Tr., Vol. Ill, pp. 449-455; Vol. V, pp. 760-764.
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Di

trict Court's ruling, it shows at most that seller and his attorne
closing their eyes to what buyers intended or believed, concluded
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seller could avoid paying the $5000, while buyers, taking the precaution that their views were expresed in the instrument, believed at all
times that the $5000 had to be paid.

That is, there is, at 'best, an

unresolvable conflict in the evidence to support the District Court's
ruling.

Nothing in the ruling indicates an attempt to resolve this

conflict.

Tax Considerations
Further, while correctly holding that the overall purpose of the
transactions was to secure certain tax benefits to appellants, the
Court has eliminated what appellants testified without contradition
they believed was essential to any tax benefit with regard to the
land, namely, payment of an independent consideration for the Option.
Absent payment of independent consideration for the Option, the transaction was subject to being construed as "the functional equivalent of
a loan", as the District Court construed it, with the effect that
capital gains treatment of proceeds of the sale of the property by
appellants would be disallowed.

All witnesses, including Allen, test-

ified that absent the availability of capital gains treatment, appellants would not have done the deal.

Tr., Vol. I, pp. 45, 95-96, 111;

Vol. Ill, pp. 381-386, 419, 435; Vol. IV, pp. 537-542, 570; Vol. V,
pp. 731-732, 740-744.

Applicable Law
The Court's ruling is incorrect becuase it sets an unprecedented
standard of proof for disregard of the plain terms of written documents, and one in direct conflict with the only applicable Utah authorities (Corey v. Roberts, 25 P.2d 940, 942, 947 (Utah, 1933); Clark
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v. George, 234 P.2d 844 (Utah, 1951); Christensen v. Christensen, 339
P.2d 101 (Utah, 1959); and see Thomas v. Ogden State Bank, 13 P.2d 636
(Utah, 1932); Kjar v. Brimley, 27 U.2d 411, P.2d 23 (1972)) and because it relieves the seller in this transaction of the obligation to
provide buyers a central consideration all parties agree was due,
namely, the wherewithal to claim capital gains treatment, in disregarc
of applicable Utah authority.

Paloni v. Beebe, 110 P.2d 563 (Utah,

1941) .
The law of Utah is that, where documents on their face absolute
deeds are sought to be construed, alone or together with other documents, as indicating in effect a loan against the title, reserving to
seller for free a right to re-purchase at a price, plaintiff must
show, by clear and convincing evidence, that both sides of the transaction so regarded the documents,

Corey v. Roberts, supra; Clark v.

George, supra; Thomas v. Ogden State Bank, supra.
what has happened in the present case:

That is precisely

the District Court has taken

plain contract of sale and resulting deed, and, construing it with a
plain option to re-purchase, found "the functional equivalent of a
loan", reserving to seller without further payment a right to repurchase.

It has done this on the basis of the testimony of one sid

of the transaction, without evidence of any kind that the other side
of the transaction ever regarded the transaction as anything but whc
appears from the documents.
The line of cases beginning with Corey v. Roberts provides the
only applicable analogy for an appropriate evidentiary standard in
this case.

The purpose of the rule of Corey v. Roberts and similar

cases is plain:

the clear terms of written documents may not be

overthrown based solely upon the self-serving testimony of one side
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the transaction.

The same rule should be applied in the present case.

The Court's present ruling announces a rule that payments plainly
required in writing may be excused upon no more evidence than the
obligor's denial that he believed he should pay.
The further effect of the Court's construction is that, as a
result of escaping payment of independant consideration for the option, seller avoids providing buyers what they bargained for, captial
gains treatment of proceeds of any sale, in violation of the rule
announced in Paloni v. Beebe, supra.
The Paloni rule serves a simlar purpose:

self-serving parol will

not be permitted to reduce the obligations of one side of a transaction to the detriment of the other.

Relief Sought
The Court should review the evidence of both sides of the
transaction, to determine whether it meets the evidentiary standard
established in this State.

Dated this 29th day of February, 1988.

I certify that this Petition for
Rehearing is submitted in good
faith and not for delay:
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